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Abstract 
   Amour-­‐‑propre  is  a  crucial  concept  of  Rousseau'ʹs  philosophy.  Although  recent  
studies  have  confirmed  its  moral  ambiguity,  they  paid  insufficient  attention  to  
Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  amour-­‐‑propre  in  his  Emile  and  thus  failed  to  appreciate  the  method  
Rousseau  proposes  therein  to  tame  Emile'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre.  By  close  textual  examinations  
of  Emile,  especially  of  the  first  part  of  its  Book  IV,  this  paper  analyzes  the  moral  
ambiguity  of  amour-­‐‑propre  and  Rousseau'ʹs  remedy  for  its  almost  inevitable  inflammation.  
Rather  than  eliminating  amour-­‐‑propre,  the  education  of  Emile  aims  at  preventing  his  
innocuous  amour-­‐‑propre  from  being  inflamed.  This  at  first  requires  that  a  cosmopolitan  
type  of  friendship  be  cultivated  in  Emile'ʹs  heart  so  as  to  further  cultivate  his  pity.  Yet  
since  the  origin  of  the  problem  of  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre  is  the  relativity  intrinsic  to  
human  society  and  comparisons,  pity,  which  is  equally  relative/inter-­‐‑subjective,  may  
suffer  from  the  same  problem  of  amour-­‐‑propre.    Therefore,  Rousseau  bases  his  remedial  
project  upon  the  indestructible  "ʺtrue  relations  of  man"ʺ  (i.e.  natural  equality  of  man)  that  
is  objective  (or  non-­‐‑relational)  and  guides  Emile'ʹs  affections  towards  these  relations  so  as  
to  make  it  possible  for  Emile  to  know  all  human  relations  and  comparisons  without  
taking  any  of  them  seriously.     
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I. Introduction 
Amour-­‐‑propre  is  one  of  the  central  themes  of  Rousseau'ʹs  works,  but  its  nature  
remains  unclear  to  his  readers.  Too  often  Rousseau  condemns  it  as  the  source  of  human  
wickedness,  yet  it  is  this  same  Rousseau  who  sometimes  attributes  to  amour-­‐‑propre  good  
qualities.  Perhaps  the  moral  ambiguity  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  best  manifested  in  Rousseau'ʹs  
claim  that,  "ʺAmour-­‐‑propre  is  a  useful  but  dangerous  instrument."ʺ1  If  amour-­‐‑propre  is  
dangerous,  then  for  what  purpose  do  we  have  to  use  it?  If  amour-­‐‑propre  is  useful,  then  
how  can  we  avoid  its  danger?  This  paper  is  intended  to  deal  with  the  moral  ambiguity  
of  amour-­‐‑propre  and  these  subsequent  questions  derived  from  it.  Since  Book  IV  of  Emile  
devotes  considerable  number  of  pages  to  describing  the  nature  of  amour-­‐‑propre  and  ways  
to  put  it  under  our  control,  an  intensive  reading  of  this  Book,  especially  the  part2  before  
the  Profession  of  the  Savoyard  Vicar,  is  thus  helpful  to  shed  light  upon  our  questions.  
   Given  that  Rousseau  seems  paying  more  attention  to  warning  us  the  danger  of  
amour-­‐‑propre  than  to  demonstrating  its  usefulness,  we  are  justified  to  begin  our  study  of  
amour-­‐‑propre  by  working  on  the  question  about  how  we  can  avoid  its  danger.  This  
project  is  thus  properly  named  "ʺtaming  amour-­‐‑propre."ʺ  It  is  not  "ʺeliminating"ʺ  amour-­‐‑propre,  
                                                                                                              
1  Jean-­‐‑Jacques  Rousseau:  Emile,  or  On  Education  (Allan  Bloom  trans.).  New  York,  NY:  Basic  Books,  1979:  244.    
2  Though  Rousseau  did  not  make  this  identification,  for  convenience,  I  would  denote  this  part  as  the  first  of  
the  three  parts  of  Book  IV  of  Emile.  The  substantial  content  of  the  second  part  is  the  Profession,  but  may  also  
include  paragraphs  before  it  on  the  education  of  religion  as  well  as  on  the  background  of  the  Profession.  The  
third  part  is  all  the  rest  of  Book  IV  (short  of  the  paragraph  immediately  after  the  Profession).    
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because  such  elimination  is  neither  realistic  nor  desirable,  as  I  will  soon  demonstrate.  
Rather,  an  educator  has  to  be  aware  of  the  fact  that  amour-­‐‑propre,  if  left  unattended,  will  
easily  go  wild  and  become  damaging  to  both  his  pupil'ʹs  happiness  and  the  well-­‐‑being  of  
society  at  large.    
In  recent  years,  there  have  been  several  illuminating  studies  concentrating  upon  
the  issue  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  Unlike  earlier  studies  that  simply  treat  amour-­‐‑propre  as  a  vice,  
Nicholas  Dent,  Laurence  Cooper,  Frederick  Neuhouser,  and  Michael  McLendon3  all  
confirm  the  ambiguity  of  the  role  of  amour-­‐‑propre  to  man'ʹs  morality  and  happiness  and  
thus  take  more  careful  approaches  to  examine  the  possibility  to  deal  with  negative  
effects  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  Although  their  accounts  shed  much  light  upon  Rousseau'ʹs  
general  idea  of  amour-­‐‑propre,  none  of  them  conducts  in  their  writings  intensive  textual  
analysis  of  Emile.  It  follows  that  all  of  them  more  or  less  underestimate  the  special  
character  of  amour-­‐‑propre  illustrated  in  Emile  (especially  its  Book  IV)  and  thus  fail  to  
appreciate  the  educational  method  Rousseau  proposes  therein  as  well  as  its  
philosophical  foundation.  For  example,  faced  with  the  problem  that  pity  may  produce,  
Neuhouser  claims  that  Rousseau'ʹs  solution  to  the  inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  so  
                                                                                                              
3  Nicholas  Dent:  Rousseau:  An  Introduction  to  his  Psychological,  Social  and  Political  Theory.  Oxford:  Basil  
Blackwell,  1988.  Lawrence  Cooper:  Rousseau,  Nature,  And  the  Problem  of  the  Good  Life.  University  Park,  PA:  
The  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press,  1999.  Frederick  Neuhouser:  Rousseau'ʹs  Theodicy  of  Self-­‐‑Love.  Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2008.  Michael  McLendon:  "ʺRousseau  and  the  Minimal  Self:  A  Solution  to  the  
Problem  of  Amour-­‐‑Propre,"ʺ  European  Journal  of  Political  Theory  0(0),  2013:  1-­‐‑21.    
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sketchily  described  in  Emile  that  "ʺ[t]he  suspicion  that  is  hard  to  dispel...  is  that  
Rousseau'ʹs  powerful  case  for  the  malignant  potential  of  amour-­‐‑propre  ends  up  
formulating  so  enormous  a  problem  that  his  remedial  project  cannot  fully  solve  it."ʺ4  
However,  careful  analysis  of  Emile  clearly  illustrates  that  Rousseau  provides  a  sound  
remedy  for  this  problem.  In  my  analysis  of  Emile,  I  will  comment  on  each  of  their  
interpretations  of  Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  amour-­‐‑propre  where  they  have  particular  
relevance  to  the  immediate  topic,  and  subsequently  point  out  their  misunderstandings.    
In  the  following  pages,  I  will  at  first  reconstruct  an  account  of  Rousseau'ʹs  
understanding  of  amour-­‐‑propre  in  Emile  in  order  to  reveal  the  ambiguous  nature  of  
amour-­‐‑propre.  (Section  II)  This  reconstruction  is  followed  by  an  analysis  of  difficult  
problems  Rousseau  will  have  to  encounter  when  trying  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre.  (Section  III)  
Conscious  of  these  difficulties,  I  will  then  illustrate  what  Rousseau  specifically  proposes  
as  the  first  step  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre  without  being  trapped  in  them.  This  proposal  
hinges  upon  his  idea  of  a  cosmopolitan  type  of  friendship  and  its  close  relation  to  pity.  
(Section  IV)  In  the  next  section,  however,  I  will  reveal  that  pity  is  probably  as  
problematic  as  amour-­‐‑propre,  and  that  their  problems  actually  have  a  same  origin.  
(Section  V)  This  requires  us  to  find  a  more  solid  ground  on  which  Rousseau  is  able  to  
articulate  a  sound  solution  to  the  problems  of  both  amour-­‐‑propre  and  pity  and  the  ways  
                                                                                                              
4  Neuhouser:  180.  
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in  which  the  educator  makes  it  possible  to  draw  Emile'ʹs  attention  towards  it.  This  solid  
ground,  as  I  will  illustrate,  is  what  Rousseau  calls  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man,"ʺ  and  these  
true  relations  may  become  Emile'ʹs  moral  caliber  only  by  moving  his  affections.  (Sections  
VI-­‐‑VII)  In  the  light  of  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man"ʺ  as  well  as  the  ways  to  teach  it,  I  will  
then  turn  back  to  the  issue  of  pity  and  point  out  both  its  usage  in  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  
and  its  limits  that  we  have  to  be  aware  of.  (Section  VIII)  Finally,  I  will  conclude  by  
illustrating  the  successfulness  of  Rousseau'ʹs  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  and  further  
suggest  the  philosophical  implications  of  this  success.  (Section  IX)    
  
  5  
II. Rousseau's Account of Amour-Propre: Innocuous or 
Inflamed 
To  understand  how  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre,  it  is  necessary  to  firstly  understand  
what  amour-­‐‑propre  is.  This  is  no  easy  task  because,  as  Lawrence  Cooper  points  out,  
"ʺRather  than  identify  its  abstract,  purposive  essence,  his  [Rousseau'ʹs]  discussions  of  
amour-­‐‑propre  are  more  phenomenological."ʺ1  There  is  thus  danger  that  our  abstraction  of  
Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  amour-­‐‑propre  from  these  phenomenological  discussions  is  merely  
partial.2  However,  for  present  purposes,  this  difficulty  could  be  overcome  to  some  extent.  
For  two  reasons,  I  would  argue  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  grasp  the  "ʺessence"ʺ  of  amour-­‐‑
propre.  First,  given  Rousseau'ʹs  strong  aversion  against  abuses  of  reason  and  metaphysics,  
this  essence  seems  so  metaphysical  that  Rousseau  himself  might  not  be  happy  to  see  it  
being  abstracted  from  his  writings.  Second,  insofar  as  we  limit  our  discussion  of  amour-­‐‑
propre  within  Book  IV  of  Emile,  what  we  acquire  from  this  discussion  would  suffice,  at  
least  for  the  time  being,  to  support  our  understanding  of  Rousseau'ʹs  ways  to  tame  
amour-­‐‑propre  explicated  in  this  Book  alone.    
To  begin  with,  three  particularly  relevant  descriptions  of  amour-­‐‑propre  appear  in  
Book  IV  (bold  mine):  3    
                                                                                                              
1  Cooper:  138.    
2  Cooper  admirably  identifies  eight  different  generalizations  of  the  meaning  of  amour-­‐‑propre  and  proves  that  
none  of  them  catches  the  true  essence  of  it.  (Cooper:  137-­‐‑50)    
3  Emile:  214,  221,  235.    
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(1)  "ʺAmour-­‐‑propre,  which  makes  comparisons,  is  never  content  and  never  could  
be,  because  this  sentiment,  preferring  ourselves  to  others,  also  demands  others  to  prefer  
us  to  themselves,  which  is  impossible.  This  is  how  the  gentle  and  affectionate  passions  
are  born  of  self-­‐‑love,  and  how  the  hateful  and  irascible  passions  are  born  of  amour-­‐‑
propre."ʺ    
(2)  "ʺThe  sight  of  a  happy  man  inspires  in  others  less  love  than  envy.  They  would  
gladly  accuse  him  of  usurping  a  right  he  does  not  have  in  giving  himself  an  exclusive  
happiness;  and  amour-­‐‑propre  suffers,  too,  in  making  us  feel  that  this  man  has  no  need  of  
us."ʺ    
(3)  "ʺThe  first  sentiment  aroused  in  him  by  this  comparison  [comparing  Emile  
himself  to  his  fellows]  is  the  desire  to  be  in  the  first  position.  This  is  the  point  where  love  
of  self  turns  into  amour-­‐‑propre  and  where  begin  to  arise  all  the  passions  which  depend  on  
this  one."ʺ    
At  the  first  glance,  these  three  descriptions  share  one  significant  similarity:  
amour-­‐‑propre  intrinsically  requires  comparison  of  oneself  to  others.  It  is  due  to  this  
characteristic  that  Rousseau  asserts  that  amour-­‐‑propre,  in  contrast  to  the  "ʺabsolute  
sentiment"ʺ  of  amour  de  soi,  is  merely  relative.4    
                                                                                                              
4  Rousseau:  Second  Discourse  Note  XV.  From  The  Discourses  and  Other  Early  Political  Writings  (Victor  
Gourevitch  trans.),  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1997:  218.    
  7  
Yet  closer  examinations  reveal  subtle  differences  among  these  descriptions.  In  (1),  
amour-­‐‑propre  has  a  two-­‐‑fold  requirement:  it  requires  not  only  one'ʹs  preference  of  oneself,  
but  also  a  return  of  preference,  or  recognition,  from  others.  This  return  of  preference,  
however,  is  not  required  by  amour-­‐‑propre  in  (3).    
Closer  readings  suggest  that,  when  asserting  in  (1)  that  amour-­‐‑propre  not  only  
requires  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑preference  but  also  others'ʹ  preference  of  oneself,  Rousseau  is  actually  
describing  a  discontent  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  ("ʺnever  content  and  never  could  be"ʺ).  But  
why  is  this  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  discontent?  The  reason  lies  not  essentially  in  amour-­‐‑
propre'ʹs  requirement  of  self-­‐‑preference,  but  in  that  of  others'ʹ  preference  of  one  to  
themselves.  Since  it  is  impossible  that  others  would  always  prefer  one  to  themselves,  
this  requirement  of  amour-­‐‑propre  could  never  be  fulfilled.5  The  account  of  amour-­‐‑propre  in  
(2),  where  Rousseau  states  that  amour-­‐‑propre  could  suffer,  further  strengthens  this  
argument.  When  seeing  a  happy  man,  one  feels  oneself  not  being  much  needed.  This  
feeling  suggests  that  one  finds  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑recognized  importance  not  being  recognized  by  
that  happy  man,  because  one  is  unimportant  to  that  man'ʹs  happiness.  Since  from  this  
discontent/suffering  amour-­‐‑propre  comes  "ʺthe  hateful  and  irascible  passions,"ʺ  man  
becomes  bad  when  one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  "ʺsuffers."ʺ  Amour-­‐‑propre  is  thus  inflamed.    
                                                                                                              
5  Several  reasons  explain  why  this  is  impossible.  For  present  purposes,  I  will  only  focus  on  the  reciprocal  
nature  of  love  and  friendship,  which  I  will  analyze  in  Section  III.    
  8  
If  it  is  true  that  amour-­‐‑propre  gets  inflamed  due  to  the  impossibility  to  let  others  
always  prefer  one  to  themselves,  and  that  this  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre  makes  man  bad,  
then  the  accounts  of  amour-­‐‑propre  in  (1)  and  (2)  implicitly  suggest  that  the  type  of  amour-­‐‑
propre  that  solely  requires  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑preference  does  not  "ʺsuffer"ʺ  and  thus  may  not  
necessarily  lead  to  human  wickedness.  We  are  thus  directed  to  examine  the  account  in  
(3),  where  amour-­‐‑propre  is  seen  as  one'ʹs  "ʺdesire  to  be  in  the  first  position,"ʺ  but  not  
necessarily  be  so  recognized  by  others.  Rousseau  states  that  "ʺThis  is  the  point  where  love  
of  self  turns  into  amour-­‐‑propre."ʺ  This  statement  is  significant  in  that  it  suggests  that  the  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  which  does  not  demand  recognition  from  others  plays  a  transitional  
role  in  the  development  from  amour  de  soi  to  certain  well-­‐‑developed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  
In  other  words,  amour-­‐‑propre  that  only  requires  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑preference  might  be  seen  as  
incomplete  and  innocuous.  From  this  incomplete/innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  "ʺbegin  
to  arise  all  the  passions  which  depend  on  this  one."ʺ  Indeed,  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑
propre  thus  originates  from  it,  and,  given  its  destructiveness  to  human  goodness,  the  
inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  seen  as  the  well-­‐‑developed  (namely,  fully-­‐‑
corrupted)  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  that  becomes  a  real  problem  to  Emile'ʹs  education.    
The  incompleteness  and  transitional  nature  of  the  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  that  solely  
requires  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑preference  is  manifested  not  only  in  its  similarity  to  the  inflamed  type  
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of  amour-­‐‑propre,  but  also  in  that  to  amour  de  soi.6  To  be  sure,  amour  de  soi  differs  from  any  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  because  it  requires  no  comparison  of  oneself  to  others,  which  
comparison  is  essential  to  amour-­‐‑propre.  Yet  it  is  still  similar  to  the  incomplete/innocuous  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  because  both  of  them  are  essentially  self-­‐‑focused.  When  one  prefers  
oneself  to  others,  one  does  not  have  to  rely  on  the  opinion  of  others.  This  reliance  
becomes  necessary  only  when  amour-­‐‑propre  is  inflamed.  It  thus  follows  that  this  
incomplete  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre,  before  any  further  development,  is  truly  free  from  
"ʺsuffering"ʺ  simply  because  amour-­‐‑propre  "ʺsuffers"ʺ  only  due  to  the  absence  of  the  
recognition  of  others  when  one  demands  it.7    
To  conclude,  from  Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  amour-­‐‑propre  in  Book  IV,  we  could  
identify  two  different  but  closely  related  types  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  One  type  is  what  we  
                                                                                                              
6  Lawrence  Cooper  claims  that,  "ʺOnly  passion  that  is  wholesome  and  benign,  that  expresses  nature'ʹs  order,  
derives  from  amour  de  soi...  Whatever  is  not  wholesome  and  benign,  whatever  does  not  express  nature'ʹs  
order,  does  not  derive  from  amour  de  soi."ʺ  (Cooper:  134)  I  believe  this  claim  is  inaccurate.  First,  Rousseau  
explicitly  states  that  "ʺThe  source  of  our  passions,  the  origin  and  the  principle  of  all  the  others,  the  only  one  
born  with  man  and  which  never  leaves  him  so  long  as  he  lives  is  self-­‐‑love  (l'ʹamour  de  soi)  -­‐‑-­‐‑  a  primitive,  
innate  passion,  which  is  anterior  to  every  other,  and  of  which  all  others  are  in  a  sense  only  
modifications."ʺ(Emile:  214)  Therefore,  all  the  passions  other  than  amour  de  soi  have  amour  de  soi  as  their  origin  
in  addition  to  "ʺalien  causes."ʺ  (Ibid.)  Second,  it  might  be  wrong  to  see  passions  as  either  wholesome  or  not  
wholesome.  Amour-­‐‑propre,  for  instance,  is  morally  ambiguous.  If  badly  guided,  amour-­‐‑propre  indeed  suffers  
and  becomes  the  source  of  all  the  human  evilness;  yet  if  well  guided,  which  is  a  rare  case  but  deserves  
striving  for,  amour-­‐‑propre  can  develop  into  human  virtue.  In  fact,  the  moral  ambiguity  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  one  
of  the  central  points  that  Cooper  makes  in  his  book.  It  is  thus  unclear  to  me  why  he  offers  such  a  claim  that  
is  not  only  inaccurate  but  also  contrary  to  his  own  arguments.    
7  The  strongest  support  for  my  differentiation  between  the  two  types  of  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  found  in  Book  V  
where  Rousseau  compares  Emile'ʹs  jealousy  and  that  of  others.  Emile'ʹs  jealousy  is  parallel  to  the  incomplete  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  and  jealousy  of  others  to  the  suffering  type.  The  governor  does  not  eliminate  Emile'ʹs  
jealousy  because  this  is  impossible.  Rather,  he  guides  it  by  education  so  that  Emile  "ʺwill  pay  far  more  
attention  to  winning  his  mistress  than  to  threatening  his  rival"ʺ,  because  Emile  understands  that  "ʺthe  right  of  
preference  is  founded  solely  on  merit  and  that  honor  is  to  be  found  in  success."ʺ  As  a  result,  "ʺhe  will  redouble  
his  efforts  to  make  himself  lovable,  and  he  will  probably  succeed."ʺ  (Emile:  431)    
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called  the  incomplete,  or  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre,  which  requires  only  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑
preference  to  others  and  is  yet  to  develop  into  a  more  complete  type.  The  other  type  is  
what  we  called  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  because  it  is  developed  from  the  
innocuous  type  and  demands  in  addition  others'ʹ  preference  of  one  to  themselves.  While  
the  inflamed  type  necessarily  leads  to  the  corruption  of  human  goodness  due  to  its  
constant  reliance  on  the  opinion  of  others,  which  is  impossible  to  constantly  attain,  the  
innocuous  type  is  not  easily  corrupted  because  it  essentially  points  to  oneself  and  only  to  
oneself,  and  thus  will  not  "ʺsuffer."ʺ  Since  the  incomplete/innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  
will,  without  "ʺart  and  care"ʺ8,  necessarily  develop  (or  deteriorate)  into  the  inflamed  type  
from  which  all  human  evils  emerge,  an  inquiry  into  the  ways  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  is  
reasonably  transformed  into  an  inquiry  into  those  of  preventing  the  inflamed  type  of  
amour-­‐‑propre  from  being  aroused.    
  
                                                                                                              
8  Emile:  214.    
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III. Human Need of Companion And the Problem of 
Taming Amour-Propre1 
To  understand  how  the  arousal  of  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  
prevented,  it  is  worthwhile  to  know  how  the  transformation  of  the  incomplete/  
innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  into  the  inflamed  one  is  possible.  We  know  that  amour-­‐‑
propre,  in  general,  has  to  develop  in  one'ʹs  adolescence,  and  "ʺ[a]s  soon  as  amour-­‐‑propre  has  
developed,  the  relative  I  is  constantly  in  play,  and  the  young  man  never  observes  others  
without  returning  to  himself  and  comparing  himself  with  them."ʺ2  It  does  not  follow,  
however,  that  amour-­‐‑propre  has  to  "ʺsuffer"ʺ  in  this  development.  We  have  seen  from  
above  that  amour-­‐‑propre  "ʺsuffers"ʺ  only  if  it  requires  others  to  prefer  one  to  themselves,  
which  preference  could  never  be  fulfilled,  but  comparing  oneself  to  others  and  thereby  
knowing  the  opinion  of  others  does  not  necessarily  entails  one'ʹs  reliance  on  that  opinion  
as  one'ʹs  standard  to  judge  oneself.  For  the  emergence  of  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑
propre,  there  still  lacks  an  impulse  that  motivates  one  to  willingly  take  the  opinion  of  
others  seriously  and  subject  oneself  to  it.    
This  impulse,  as  Rousseau  suggests,  is  "ʺneed  of  a  companion."ʺ  Once  one  feels  this  
need,  "ʺall  his  relations  with  his  species,  all  the  affections  of  his  soul  are  born  with  this  
one."ʺ  This  need  of  a  companion  exhibits  itself  in  two  forms,  love  and  friendship.  From  
                                                                                                              
1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  citations  in  this  section  are  from  Emile:  214-­‐‑5  
2  Ibid:  243.    
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them  "ʺdissensions,  enmity,  and  hate"ʺ  will  arise.3  It  thus  indicates  that  the  passions  of  
love  and  friendship  are  responsible  for  the  transformation  of  the  incomplete/  innocuous  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  into  its  inflamed  type,  namely,  for  the  emergence  of  one'ʹs  reliance  
on  the  opinion  of  others:  "ʺFrom  the  bosom  of  so  many  diverse  passions  I  see  opinion  
raising  an  unshakable  throne,  and  stupid  mortals,  subjected  to  its  empire,  basing  their  
own  existence  on  the  judgments  of  others."ʺ    
How  do  love  and  friendship  lead  to  this  transformation?  The  answer  lies  in  the  
nature  of  love  and  friendship:  they  are  both  reciprocal.4  That  is  to  say,  they  are  not  
satisfied  until  favor  is  returned:  "ʺTo  be  loved,  one  has  to  make  oneself  lovable."ʺ  Similarly,  
"ʺit  is  only  in  returning  or  feigning  to  return  friendship  that  one  can  obtain  it."ʺ5  
Consequently,  one  needs  to  win  the  preference  of  the  beloved  over  others  in  order  to  
attain  love  or  friendship  (which  can  be  deemed  as  "ʺlove  by  everyone,"ʺ  an  extension  of  
"ʺlove  by  a  mistress"ʺ).  "ʺTo  be  preferred,  one  has  to  make  oneself  more  lovable  than  
another,  more  lovable  than  every  other,  at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  beloved  object."ʺ  
However,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  impossible  to  fulfill  this  demand  imposed  onto  others.  
Since  comparison,  which  differentiates,  is  required  by  love  and  friendship,  love  and  
friendship  usually  appear  intrinsically  partisan,  and  one  cannot  equally  love  or  befriend  
                                                                                                              
3  Ibid:  215.  The  sequence  between  the  birth  of  love  and  that  of  friendship  is  crucial  to  this  paper,  which  I  will  
examine  in  Section  IV.    
4  See  also  ibid:  233.      
5  Ibid.    
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everyone.6  It  is  thus  inevitable  that  he  who  loves  her  is  not  necessarily  loved  by  her,  or  at  
least  not  necessarily  loved  as  much  as  he  loves  her.  As  a  result,  from  the  need  to  win  
preference  of  others,  amour-­‐‑propre  will  "ʺget  the  form  we  believe  natural  to  it."ʺ  Feeling  
oneself  not  being  equally  loved,  one  is  tortured  by  the  thought  that  one  does  not  receive  
equal  recognition  from  others  that  one  believes  one  deserves.  Amour-­‐‑propre  thus  
"ʺsuffers."ʺ    
If  need  of  a  companion  is  exhibited  as  love  and  friendship,  if  the  reciprocity  and  
partisanship  required  by  love  and  friendship  necessarily  lead  to  the  inflammation  of  
amour-­‐‑propre,  and  if  reciprocity  (as  well  as  partisanship)  is  the  essence  of  love  and  
friendship  (which  means  that  love  and  friendship  without  them  are  by  definition  love  
and  friendship  no  more),  then  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  that  the  way  to  prevent  the  
emergence  of  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  nothing  but  the  elimination  of  
this  dangerous  need  of  a  companion.    
However,  Rousseau  makes  it  clear  that  this  elimination  is  neither  possible  nor  
desirable.  In  the  first  place,  human  need  of  companion  originates  from  human  
insufficiency:  "ʺIt  is  man'ʹs  weakness  which  makes  him  sociable...  Every  attachment  is  a  
sign  of  insufficiency.  If  each  of  us  had  no  need  of  others,  he  would  hardly  think  of  
                                                                                                              
6  Masters  confirms  this  argument  by  describing  love  and  friendship  as  "ʺhuman  affections"ʺ  that  are  both  
exclusive  and  reciprocal.  (Roger  Masters:  The  Political  Philosophy  of  Rousseau.  Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  
University  Press,  1968:  40,  49.  )  Note,  however,  that  Rousseau  does  not  see  friendship  as  necessarily  partisan,  
and  that  the  possibility  of  a  nonpartisan  type  of  friendship  is  his  hope  that  pity  can  be  so  well  cultivated  in  
friendship  as  to  restrain  the  negative  effects  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  I  will  examine  this  point  in  Section  IV.    
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uniting  himself  with  them."ʺ7  The  savage  man  in  the  state  of  nature  may  be  self-­‐‑sufficient,  
but  once  socialized,  men  can  never  again  return  to  that  state.  In  the  second  place,  and  
more  importantly,  Rousseau  further  rejects  this  option  on  the  ground  of  its  
undesirability:  "ʺI  do  not  conceive  how  someone  who  needs  nothing  can  love  anything.  I  
do  not  conceive  how  someone  who  loves  nothing  can  be  happy."ʺ8  Happiness  comes  
from  love,  which  requires  this  very  need  of  companion.9  It  is  thus  nonsensical  to  
eliminate  the  need  of  companion  in  order  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre,  because  such  
elimination  is  contrary  to  the  very  aim  of  preventing  amour-­‐‑propre  from  inflammation:  to  
allow  Emile  to  preserve  his  goodness,  to  stay  within  himself,  and,  subsequently,  to  enjoy  
his  happiness  therein.10  Moreover,  another  reason  that  renders  it  undesirable  to  
eliminate  love  is  that  love  plays  a  particularly  important  role  in  the  study  of  human  
relations.  This  study  becomes  suitable  for  man  when  he  reaches  his  adolescence  and  
"ʺbegins  to  sense  his  moral  being"ʺ  because  without  knowledge  of  human  relations  it  is  
impossible  to  remain  uncorrupted  in  the  face  of  amour-­‐‑propre.11  Yet  reason  is  insufficient  
                                                                                                              
7  Emile:  221.    
8  Ibid.    
9  Only  in  this  light  can  we  understand  why  Rousseau  claims  in  the  Second  Discourse  that,  rather  than  the  
state  of  nature,  the  "ʺperiod  in  the  development  of  human  faculties,  occupying  a  just  mean  between  the  
indolence  of  the  primitive  state  and  the  petulant  activity  of  our  amour-­‐‑propre,  must  have  been  the  happiest  
and  the  most  lasting  epoch...  the  best  for  men,"ʺ  (italic  mine)  because  love,  which  is  absent  in  the  state  of  
nature,  has  emerged  here.  (Second  Discourse:  167)    
10  Emile:  229-­‐‑30.    
11  For  an  intensive  study  of  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man"ʺ  and  of  its  crucial  role  to  taming  amour-­‐‑propre,  see  
Sections  VI  and  VII.      
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to  clearly  see  these  relations.  Rather,  love  "ʺhas  better  eyes  than  we  do  and  sees  relations  
we  are  not  able  to  perceive."ʺ  In  other  words,  love  is  not  only  powerful  to  push  amour-­‐‑
propre  to  corruption,  but  also  crucial  for  taming  it.    
Thus,  we  encounter  a  problem  that  makes  it  difficult  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre.  On  
the  one  hand,  one'ʹs  need  of  a  companion  is  the  impulse  that  necessarily  propels  one  to  
constantly  rely  on  the  opinion  of  others  and  thus  makes  one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  "ʺsuffer."ʺ  On  
the  other  hand,  it  is  precisely  this  need  that  brings  about  one'ʹs  happiness.  Therefore,  the  
task  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre  has  to  face  the  challenge  that,  while  one  needs  to  restrain  the  
sources  of  the  inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre,  namely,  love  and  friendship,  one  at  the  
same  time  must  not  restrain  them  so  much  as  to  stifle  them.  Yet  as  long  as  these  sources  
are  not  completely  restrained  and  thus  remain,  their  reciprocal  nature  will  necessarily  
lead  to  the  clash  between  the  desire  to  win  preference  of  others  and  the  reality  that  this  
desire  cannot  be  always  fulfilled,  thereby  causing  amour-­‐‑propre  to  "ʺsuffer"ʺ  and  probably  
announcing  the  failure  of  the  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre.  Are  we  truly  able  to  tame  
amour-­‐‑propre  without  undermining  human  happiness?  
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IV. Friendship and Taming Amour-Propre: A Preliminary 
Survey1 
Rousseau'ʹs  delicate  solution  to  this  challenging  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  
begins  with  his  attention  to  the  sequence  of  emergence  of  love  and  friendship.  On  the  
one  hand,  Rousseau  suggests  that  the  birth  of  love  precedes  that  of  friendship:  "ʺFrom  the  
need  for  a  mistress  is  soon  born  the  need  for  a  friend.  He  who  senses  how  sweet  it  is  to  
be  loved  would  want  to  be  loved  by  everyone."ʺ2  On  the  other  hand,  he  tells  us  that,  "ʺThe  
first  sentiment  of  which  a  carefully  raised  young  man  is  capable  is  not  love;  it  is  
friendship.  The  first  act  of  his  nascent  imagination  is  to  teach  him  that  he  has  fellows."ʺ  
There  is  no  contradiction  between  these  two  statements.  Whereas  in  most  cases  of  
education  love  is  born  before,  and  then  gives  birth  to,  friendship,  only  in  "ʺa  carefully  
raised  young  man"ʺ  can  friendship  emerge  before  love.3  Since  amour-­‐‑propre  and  all  its  
evils  are  subsequently  born  from  the  former  case,4  which  are  exactly  what  we  take  pains  
to  avoid,  it  becomes  essential  for  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  as  its  first  step  to  give  a  young  
man  enough  "ʺart  and  care"ʺ  so  as  to  let  him  feel  friendship  before  love.    
                                                                                                              
1  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  citations  in  this  section  are  from  Emile:  220-­‐‑1.    
2  Emile:  215.    
3  This  point  is  further  substantiated  by  Rousseau'ʹs  assertion  that,  "ʺPuberty  and  sexual  potency  always  arrive  
earlier  in  learned  and  civilized  peoples  than  in  ignorant  and  barbarous  peoples."ʺ  (Emile:  215)  In  most  cases,  
the  word  civilized  used  in  his  comparison  between  the  learned  and  the  ignorant  is  equivalent  to  corrupted,  
and  barbarous  to  natural.    
4  "ʺExtend  these  ideas,  and  you  will  see  where  our  amour-­‐‑propre  gets  the  form  we  believe  natural  to  it,  and  
how  self-­‐‑love,  ceasing  to  be  an  absolute  sentiment...  feeds  itself  constantly  in  all  at  the  expense  of  their  
neighbors."ʺ  (Emile:  215)    
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To  appreciate  this  solution,  we  need  to  understand  why  love  coming  before  
friendship  is  harmful  to  the  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre,  and  why  friendship  coming  
before  love  is  helpful  to  it.  The  answer  lies  in  the  relations  of  love  and  friendship  to  pity,  
which  seems  playing  a  central  role  in  taming  amour-­‐‑propre.    
For  the  time  being,  I  will  not  expand  our  discussion  of  pity  and  how  it  serves  in  
taming  amour-­‐‑propre,  because  this  discussion  turns  out  to  be  far  more  complicated  than  it  
appears.5  For  present  purposes,  it  suffices  for  us  to  understand  that,  according  to  the  
second  and  third  maxims  of  pity,6  one  becomes  compassionate  only  when  one  truly  feels  
the  suffering  of  others  and  when  one  identifies  oneself  with  the  sufferers.  Love,  however,  
undermines  these  two  conditions.  "ʺ[Y]oung  people  who  are  corrupted  early  and  given  
over  to  women  and  debauchery  are  inhuman  and  cruel."ʺ  They  have  no  idea  of  the  
suffering  of  others  and  thus  know  "ʺneither  pity  nor  mercy."ʺ  This  inhumanity  and  cruelty  
is  the  result  of  love,  which,  as  we  have  argued,  is  profoundly  partisan.  Therefore,  rather  
than  having  the  idea  of  fellows  in  general  and  identifying  oneself  with  humanity  at  large,  
"ʺ[t]heir  imaginations,  filled  by  a  single  object,  rejected  all  the  rest."ʺ    
Friendship,  in  contrast,  is  the  womb  of  pity.  For  "ʺa  carefully  raised  young  man"ʺ  
who  is  "ʺraised  in  a  happy  simplicity"ʺ  and  who  enjoys  "ʺprolonged  innocence,"ʺ  "ʺthe  first  
act  of  his  nascent  imagination  is  to  teach  him  that  he  has  fellows;  and  the  species  affects  
                                                                                                              
5  See  Section  VIII.    
6  Emile:  224-­‐‑5.    
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him  before  the  female  sex."ʺ  Consequently,  "ʺthe  first  seeds  of  humanity"ʺ  will  be  sowed  in  
his  heart,  and  "ʺ[h]is  compassionate  heart  is  moved  by  the  sufferings  of  his  fellows."ʺ  
(Bold  mine)  
Regarding  this  understanding  of  the  relations  between  friendship  and  pity,  there  
are  two  objections  to  which  I  need  to  respond.  One  objection  is  raised  by  Roger  Masters.  
He  rejects  the  similarity  between  friendship  and  pity,  and  sees  them  differing  in  nature  
and  origin.  He  argues  that  pity  and  friendship  belong  to  different  types  of  sentiment.  
While  pity  is  a  relative  sentiment  whose  relativity  makes  it  similar  to  amour-­‐‑propre,  
friendship  is  "ʺmerely  a  'ʹsentiment'ʹ"ʺ  that  is  similar  to  love  due  to  its  reciprocity.7  His  
argument,  though  correct  in  several  minor  places,  is  fundamentally  flawed.  If  a  relative  
sentiment  such  as  pity  is  defined  by  its  requirement  of  comparison,  then  a  sentiment  
different  from  relative  sentiment  must  require  no  comparison,  which  is  thus  called  
absolute  sentiment.  As  Cooper  argues,  the  categories  of  relative  sentiment  and  of  
absolute  sentiment  are  logically  exhaustive,  and  there  cannot  be  a  third  independent  
category.8  If  friendship  is  not  a  relative  sentiment,  it  has  to  be  absolute,  which  is  
obviously  contradictory  to  Masters'ʹ  argument  that  friendship  requires  reciprocity,  which  
is  the  result  of  comparison  and  awareness  of  others.    
                                                                                                              
7  Masters:  43-­‐‑4.    
8  Cooper:  133.    
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Another  objection  is  related  to  the  partisan  nature  of  friendship.  If,  as  we  have  
argued,  friendship  is  partisan  and  thus  capable  of  inflaming  amour-­‐‑propre,  then  how  is  it  
possible  to  cultivate  pity,  which  is  intrinsically  nonpartisan,  from  friendship?  To  this  
objection,  I  would  reply  that,  for  Rousseau,  friendship  could  be  partisan,  but  not  
necessarily  so.  In  the  first  place,  friendship  is  partisan  if  it  is  born  out  of  love,  because  
love  is  necessarily  partisan.  This  birth  of  friendship,  however,  is  corrupted  and  exactly  
what  should  be  avoided.  In  the  second  place,  we  should  note  that  Rousseau'ʹs  definition  
of  friendship  itself  is  different  from  its  partisan  type.  According  to  that  definition,  one  
does  not  merely  want  to  be  a  friend  of  a  certain  figure  or  a  group  of  people,  but  of  
"ʺeveryone,"ʺ  of  "ʺhis  fellows."ʺ  In  this  sense,  rather  than  being  partisan,  friendship  is  
essentially  cosmopolitan.9  To  be  sure,  I  am  not  claiming  here  that  the  cosmopolitan  type  
of  friendship  is  the  only  type  that  Rousseau  envisions,  but  this  argument  at  least  shows  
that,  through  education,  friendship  is  not  necessarily  partisan  and  is  thus  capable  of  
giving  birth  to  pity.    
  
                                                                                                              
9  To  pick  up  a  couple  of  examples:  "ʺThe  first  sentiment  of  which  a  carefully  raised  young  man  is  capable  is  
not  love;  it  is  friendship.  This  first  act  of  his  nascent  imagination  is  to  teach  him  that  he  has  fellows."ʺ  (Emile:  
220)  "ʺWhen  the  first  movement  of  his  senses  lights  the  fire  of  imagination,  he  begins  to  feel  himself  in  his  
fellows,  to  be  moved  by  their  complaints  and  to  suffer  from  their  pains."ʺ  (Emile:  222)  (Italic  mine)    
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V. Pity as Remedy for Amour-Propre: Possibility and 
Difficulty 
So  far,  we  have  seen  that,  although  amour-­‐‑propre  begins  to  differ  from  amour  de  soi  
as  soon  as  one'ʹs  comparison  of  oneself  to  others  becomes  active,  amour-­‐‑propre  truly  
develops  into  the  origin  of  human  wickedness  and  thus  a  problem  to  human  goodness  
when  it  demands  more  than  one'ʹs  self-­‐‑preference  but  also  others'ʹ  preference  of  one  to  
themselves,  which,  due  to  the  reciprocal  nature  and  partisan  nature  of  love  and  of  they  
type  of  friendship  that  originates  from  love,  is  destined  to  be  frustrated  and  thus  
"ʺsuffers."ʺ  Given  that  it  is  impossible  to  remove  amour-­‐‑propre  itself  from  human  life,  the  
real  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  is  to  prevent  the  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  from  
degenerating  into  the  inflamed  type.  However,  since  love  and  friendship,  which  are  
manifestations  of  human  need  of  a  companion,  are  the  impulse  that  propels  amour-­‐‑propre  
to  develop  into  the  inflamed  type,  and  since  it  is  impossible  as  well  as  undesirable  to  
eliminate  them,  the  task  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  becomes  problematic  and  challenging  in  
that  it  has  to  carefully  preserve  what  constantly  drives  one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  to  "ʺsuffer,"ʺ  on  
the  one  hand,  and  make  sure  it  does  not  "ʺsuffer,"ʺ  on  the  other  hand.  In  the  face  of  this  
highly  demanding  task,  Rousseau  suggests  that  we  reverse  the  sequence  of  the  birth  of  
love  and  that  of  friendship.  While  love  always  precedes  friendship  and  gives  birth  to  it  
in  a  corrupted  man,  a  carefully  raised  man  must  be  given  enough  care  to  learn  
friendship  before  love,  so  that  his  friendship  can  be  cosmopolitan  rather  than  partisan  
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and  thus  gives  birth  to  pity,  which  seems  to  be  Rousseau'ʹs  hope  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre.  
In  this  way,  it  seems  possible  that  without  undermining  love  and  friendship,  one  can  
still  prevent  amour-­‐‑propre  from  being  inflamed.    
Why  might  Rousseau  think  pity  could  bridle  amour-­‐‑propre  before  it  has  gone  wild?  
Prior  to  understanding  this,  we  need  to  understand  how  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  tamed  at  all.  
In  Section  IV  I  have  shown  the  importance  of  a  cosmopolitan  type  of  friendship  to  
answering  this  question,  since  any  other  types  of  passion  will  inevitably  inflame  amour-­‐‑
propre  due  to  their  reciprocal  and  partisan  nature.  Thus,  it  must  be  avoided  that  passion,  
be  it  friendship  or  love,  focus  on  a  particular  object.  In  fact,  Rousseau  envisions  this  very  
cosmopolitanism  as  the  general  solution  to  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre:  "ʺLet  us  
extend  amour-­‐‑propre  to  other  things.  We  shall  transform  it  into  a  virtue,  and  there  is  no  
man'ʹs  heart  in  which  this  virtue  does  not  have  its  root.  The  less  the  object  of  our  care  is  
immediately  involved  with  us,  the  less  the  illusion  of  particular  interest  is  to  be  feared.  
The  more  one  generalizes  this  interest,  the  more  it  becomes  equitable,  and  the  love  of  
mankind  is  nothing  other  than  the  love  of  justice."ʺ1  (Bold  mine)  
Yet  one  may  wonder  why  the  virtue  into  which  the  extended  amour-­‐‑propre  is  
transformed  is  the  one  which  in  "ʺno  man'ʹs  heart...  does  not  have  its  root."ʺ  Nothing  is  
more  plausible  than  suggesting  that  the  root  of  this  virtue  must  be  natural,  and  thus,  be  
pity,  which  is  one  of  the  only  three  elements  of  human  characteristics  that  Rousseau  
                                                                                                              
1  Emile:  252.    
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attributes  to  human  nature  in  the  Second  Discourse.2  Pity  as  a  natural  human  capacity  
might  be  shrouded  by  social  inequality.  Yet  however  weak  it  might  be,  it  is  still  there  
with  all  its  potentiality:  it  is  "ʺ  the  only  Natural  virtue  which  the  most  extreme  Detractor  
of  human  virtues  was  forced  to  acknowledge"ʺ,  "ʺa  "ʺsentiment  that  is  obscure  and  lively  in  
Savage  man,  developed  but  weak  in  Civil  man."ʺ3    
In  Emile,  Rousseau  further  confirms  this  plausible  argument  based  upon  the  
Second  Discourse:  We  are  attached  to  our  fellows  by  "ʺthe  sentiment  of  their  pains,"ʺ  
namely,  pity,  and  only  in  this  can  "ʺwe  see  far  better...  the  identity  of  our  natures  with  
theirs  and  the  guarantees  of  their  attachment  to  us."ʺ4  (Bold  mine)  In  other  words,  
provided  its  conditions  are  met,  pity  as  a  natural  sentiment  that  lurks  in  everyone'ʹs  heart  
will  be  triggered  in  men,  however  corrupted  they  may  have  been,  so  that  they  may  pity  
us  when  we  suffer,  as  we  do  when  they  suffer.  Moreover,  pity  lets  us  see  "ʺthe  identity  of  
our  natures  with  theirs."ʺ5  Or  as  Rousseau  himself  puts  it  in  a  slightly  different  way,  pity  
                                                                                                              
2  The  other  two  elements  are  amour  de  soi  and  human  perfectibility.  Amour  de  soi  is  the  basis  of  pity,  since  
pity  makes  one  happy  because  one'ʹs  amour  de  soi  is  satisfied.  "ʺIn  seeing  how  many  ills  he  is  exempt  from,  he  
feels  himself  to  be  happier  than  he  had  thought  he  was."ʺ  (Emile:  229)  Needless  to  say,  perfectibility  can  
hardly  be  relied  upon  in  order  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre,  as  it  is  exactly  the  cause  that  stimulates  amour-­‐‑propre  in  
the  natural  man  and  that  further  corrupts  human  soul  in  society.    
3  Second  Discourse:  152-­‐‑3.    
4  Emile:  221.  
5  Ibid.    
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moves  us  "ʺby  transporting  ourselves  outside  of  ourselves  and  identifying  with  the  
suffering  animal,  by  leaving,  as  it  were,  our  own  being  to  take  on  its  being."ʺ6    
Thus,  this  thread  of  arguments  seems  leading  to  a  plausible  conclusion  about  the  
relations  between  pity  and  amour-­‐‑propre:  amour-­‐‑propre  can  be  tamed  if  its  object  is  
extended  to  the  entire  human  species;  this  extension  can  be  achieved  by  cultivating  pity  
because  pity  allows  one  to  identify  oneself  with  one'ʹs  species;  and  in  theory,  pity  can  be  
cultivated  within  everyone  because  it  is  part  of  indelible  human  nature.  As  a  result,  
without  eliminating  it,  pity  prevents  one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  from  being  inflamed.    
***  
This  account  of  the  relations  between  pity  and  amour-­‐‑propre,  however,  faces  a  
serious  difficulty.  Although  pity  is  capable  of  transporting  one  out  of  oneself  and  
identifying  one  with  one'ʹs  species,  this  very  transportation  and  this  very  identification  
are  the  premises  not  only  of  the  amour-­‐‑propre  as  "ʺa  virtue,"ʺ  but  also  of  effective  pity.  As  
shown  in  the  analysis  of  Section  IV,  these  premises  are  clearly  reflected  in  the  three  
maxims  of  pity,  and  are  the  reason  why  pity  can  be  cultivated  out  of  the  cosmopolitan  
type  of  friendship  rather  than  of  partisan  love.    
                                                                                                              
6  Ibid:  222.  Clifford  Orwin  asserts  in  his  study  of  the  concept  of  compassion  in  the  Second  Discourse  that,  
"ʺCompassion  is  the  last  refuge  of  nature  in  our  state  of  greatest  estrangement  from  it.  It  constitutes  the  sole  
remaining  possibility  of  communion  or  intimacy  with  our  fellow  human  beings."ʺ  See  Clifford  Orwin:  
"ʺRousseau  and  the  Discovery  of  Political  Compassion,"ʺ  The  Legacy  of  Rousseau  (ed.  Clifford  Orwin  et.  al.),  
Chicago,  IL:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1997:  298.    
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It  follows  that  amour-­‐‑propre  and  pity  flourish  and  wither  simultaneously.  If  Emile  
has  already  been  able  to  identify  himself  with  human  being  at  large,  then  there  is  no  
need  to  direct  his  pity  against  his  amour-­‐‑propre,  since  the  latter  must  have  already  
become  a  virtue.  If  Emile  is  inflicted  with  the  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre,  then  there  does  not  
seem  to  be  possibility  to  put  it  under  control  by  directing  his  pity,  since  his  pity  must  
have  already  become  less  pure  and  thus  less  effective  to  let  Emile  identify  himself  with  
his  species  rather  than  with  specific  objects.  Clifford  Orwin  correctly  explains  this  
ineffectiveness  of  the  pity  that  bases  itself  upon  a  limited  identity:  "ʺFired  with  the  
sufferings  of  a  visible  victim,  Emile  may  lose  sight  of  the  common  good;  succumbing  to  
pity  for  a  criminal,  he  may  neglect  the  interests  of  society."ʺ7  In  short,  having  lost  its  
cosmopolitan  nature,  pity  becomes  softness.  Even  Rousseau  himself  admits,  "ʺTo  prevent  
pity  from  degenerating  into  weakness,  it  must,  therefore,  be  generalized  and  extended  to  
the  whole  of  mankind."ʺ8  
Here  we  see  how  pity  is  linked  to  amour-­‐‑propre.  Amour-­‐‑propre  emerges  with  one'ʹs  
comparison  of  oneself  with  others.  So  does  pity.  Pity  is  thus  "ʺthe  first  relative  
sentiment."ʺ9  It  is  the  first  because  it  is  natural;  but  a  more  important  point  is,  it  is  relative  
because  it  presupposes  comparison.  In  other  words,  pity  can  be  seen  as  a  specific  form  of  
                                                                                                              
7  Orwin:  307-­‐‑8.    
8  Emile:  253.    
9  Ibid:  222.  
  25  
amour-­‐‑propre.  Yet  if  pity  relies  on  comparison  as  amour-­‐‑propre  does,  then  pity  may  as  well  
suffer  from  the  same  kind  of  problem  that  amour-­‐‑propre  does  due  to  the  relativity.  The  
only  difference  is,  while  the  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre  is  more  closely  related  to  envy  due  to  
the  impossibility  to  constantly  receive  other'ʹs  returned  preference,  pity  more  probably  
produces  vanity:  "ʺIn  pitying  them,  he  will  despise  them;  in  congratulating  himself,  he  
will  esteem  himself  more,  and  in  feeling  himself  to  be  happier  than  them,  he  will  believe  
himself  worthier  to  do  so."ʺ10  This  is  the  outcome  of  using  one  form  of  amour-­‐‑propre,  
namely,  pity,  to  fight  another  form,  namely,  the  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre.  It  is  here  that  
Rousseau  claims  that,  "ʺAmour-­‐‑propre  is  a  useful  but  dangerous  instrument."ʺ11  Moreover,  
this  vanity  is  "ʺthe  error  most  to  be  feared,  because  it  is  the  most  difficult  to  destroy."ʺ12  At  
least  three  reasons  explain  why  vanity  caused  by  pity  is  the  most  difficult  to  destroy.  
First,  while  envy  might  be  suppressed  by  pity,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  other  type  
of  amour-­‐‑propre  that  can  be  directed  to  suppress  vanity  caused  by  pity.  Second,  even  if  
there  were  any  other  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  that  serves  to  suppress  this  vanity,  since  it  did  
not  have  natural  human  tendency  in  support  (as  pity  does),  it  could  not  equally  occur  to  
everyone.  Third,  because  of  the  shared  premise  of  the  effective  pity  and  the  amour-­‐‑propre  
"ʺas  a  virtue"ʺ  -­‐‑-­‐‑  general  identification  of  oneself  with  one'ʹs  species  -­‐‑-­‐‑  pity  might  be  even  
                                                                                                              
10  Ibid:  245.    
11  Ibid.    
12  Ibid.    
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unable  to  suppress  envy,  as  an  envious  man  cannot  identify  himself  with  human  being  
at  large  and  thus  cannot  at  all  have  effective  pity  in  his  heart.  To  conclude,  these  
difficulties  raise  serious  doubts  about  the  possibility  of  using  pity  to  tame  amour-­‐‑propre.    
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VI. "The True Relations of Man": Its Philosophical 
Soundness 
The  difficulties  of  pity  as  solution  to  the  problem  of  amour-­‐‑propre  leads  us  to  
more  carefully  investigate  Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre.  Immediately  
before  introducing  the  concept  of  pity  into  Emile,  Rousseau  claims  the  following:    
"ʺThis  is,  then,  the  summary  of  the  whole  of  human  wisdom  in  the  use  of  passions:  
(1)  To  have  a  sense  of  the  true  relations  of  man,  with  respect  to  the  species  as  well  as  the  
individual.  (2)  To  order  all  the  affections  of  the  soul  according  to  these  relations."ʺ1  (Bold  
mine)  
As  "ʺthe  summary  of  the  whole  of  human  wisdom  in  the  use  of  passions,"ʺ  these  
two  items  are  definitely  of  considerable  significance.  In  fact,  both  of  them  revolve  
around  one  essential  concept:  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man."ʺ    
What  are  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man?"ʺ  They  are  by  definition  not  the  false  ones.  
Yet  what  are  these  false  ones?  -­‐‑-­‐‑  Let  us  consider  this  question  at  first.    
Apparently,  human  relations  seem  by  definition  presupposing  human  society,  
since  in  the  state  of  nature,  each  savage  man  lives  in  his  own  solitude  and  never  comes  
into  constant  contact  with  other  savages;  human  relations  thus  do  not  appear  to  exist.  
However,  if  this  argument  is  valid,  it  then  follows  that,  rooted  in  human  society,  these  
relations  in  question  are  closely  linked  to  human  corruption,  since,  as  Rousseau  
                                                                                                              
1  Emile:  219.    
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illustrates  in  the  Second  Discourse  and  as  Ruth  Grant  convincingly  argues,  human  society,  
which  is  intrinsically  characterized  by  human  interdependence  and  thus  almost  
inevitably  by  inequality,  necessarily  entails  human  corruption.2  It  thus  becomes  
impossible  to  base  Emile'ʹs  education  upon  these  relations,  because  they  are  capable  of  
facilitating  everything  but  one'ʹs  independence  from  corrupted  social  norms,  which  
independence  is  the  very  end  of  this  education.    
In  Emile,  Rousseau  further  falsifies  this  argument.  Immediately  following  the  
account  of  pity,  Rousseau  claims  the  need  to  let  Emile  "ʺknow  what  position  he  feels  he  
has  among  men,  and  what  kinds  of  obstacles  he  may  believe  he  has  to  overcome  to  reach  
the  position  he  wants  to  occupy,"ʺ  because  only  by  doing  so  can  we  decide  whether  
Emile'ʹs  passions,  which  arise  from  the  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre,3  "ʺwill  be  passions  
of  beneficence  and  commiseration  or  of  envy  and  covetousness."ʺ4  (Bold  mine)  Thus,  
Emile  must  learn  to  understand  human  society.  However,  by  understanding  society,  
Emile  is  going  to  keep  a  distance  from  it,  rather  than  to  embrace  it,  since  "ʺ[i]n  the  civil  
state  there  is  a  de  jure  equality  that  is  chimerical  and  vain,  because  the  means  designed  
to  maintain  it  themselves  serve  to  destroy  it."ʺ5  (Bold  mine)  Disguised  by  chimerical  
                                                                                                              
2  Ruth  Grant:  Hypocrisy  and  Integrity:  Machiavelli,  Rousseau,  and  the  Ethics  of  Politics.  Chicago,  IL:  The  
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1997:  151-­‐‑3.    
3  See  Section  II.  The  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  distinguished  from  both  amour  de  soi  and  the  inflamed  
type  of  amour-­‐‑propre.    
4  Emile:  235.  
5  Ibid:  236.  
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equality  that  society  inevitably  undermines,  human  relations  in  society  are  inequality  in  
essence.    
Furthermore,  driven  by  their  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre,  most  people  in  society  are  
not  in  unity  with  themselves.  Since  they  rely  upon  the  opinion  of  others  as  their  
standard  of  life,  they  wear  "ʺmasks."ʺ  Yet  "ʺIf  the  object  were  only  to  show  young  people  
man  by  means  of  his  mask,  there  would  be  no  need  of  showing  them  this  [i.e.  "ʺthe  
human  heart"ʺ6];  it  is  what  they  would  always  be  seeing  in  any  event.  But  since  the  mask  
is  not  the  man  and  his  varnish  must  not  seduce  them,  portray  men  for  them  such  as  they  
are  -­‐‑-­‐‑  not  in  order  that  young  people  hate  them  but  that  they  pity  them  and  not  want  to  
resemble  them."ʺ7  (Bold  mine)  In  other  words,  even  men  appearing  in  society  are  not  real,  
and  it  further  follows  that  the  inequality  of  society  is  not  real  either  (though  in  a  
different  sense  from  saying  the  "ʺchimerical  equality"ʺ  is  unreal).  With  masks  on,  those  
who  appear  superior  to  others  only  appear  happy.  Behind  this  appearance  of  superiority  
and  of  happiness  lie  equal  miseries.  In  short,  the  inequality  pervading  on  the  
phenomenal  level  of  the  world  is  by  no  means  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man."ʺ  They  are  
indeed  relations,  but  false  ones.    
Emile  should  be  deceived  neither  by  that  social  inequality  nor  by  its  outcomes.  
This  deception  is  the  common  symptom  of  envy  caused  by  amour-­‐‑propre  and  vanity  
                                                                                                              
6  Ibid.    
7  Ibid.    
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caused  by  pity.  As  for  preventing  envy,  one  should  not  show  Emile  "ʺthe  deceptive  image  
of  the  happy  man,"ʺ  because  "ʺ[t]o  show  him  the  world  before  he  knows  men  is  not  to  
form  him,  it  is  to  corrupt  him;  it  is  not  to  instruct  him,  it  is  to  deceive  him."ʺ8  (Bold  mine)  
As  for  preventing  vanity,  "ʺ[i]f  he  thus  believes  himself  to  be  of  a  more  excellent  nature  
and  more  happily  born  than  other  men,  Emile  is  wrong.  He  is  deceived."ʺ9  (Bold  mine)  It  
is  thus  clear  that  only  through  the  knowledge  of  the  true,  rather  than  deceptive,  relations  
of  man  can  Emile  be  free  from  the  ills  caused  by  both  amour-­‐‑propre  and  pity.  
Unfortunately,  this  knowledge  cannot  be  found  in  society.    
***  
However,  simply  claiming  men'ʹs  equal  misery  and  the  equal  loss  of  unity  is  
merely  presenting  a  psychological  speculation  that  may  be  applicable  to  one'ʹs  
experience  but  invalid  to  another'ʹs.  Therefore,  Rousseau  needs  a  solid  philosophical  
ground  to  base  this  claim  upon.  This  ground,  as  it  turns  out,  is  the  state  of  nature.  "ʺThe  
true  relations  of  man"ʺ  cannot  be  found  in  society,  but  "ʺ[i]n  the  state  of  nature  there  is  a  
de  facto  equality  that  is  real  and  indestructible,  because  it  is  impossible  in  that  state  for  
the  difference  between  man  and  man  by  itself  to  be  great  enough  to  make  one  
                                                                                                              
8  Ibid:  222.  
9  Ibid:  245.    
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dependent  on  another."ʺ10  (Bold  mine)  Simply  put,  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man"ʺ  are  the  
natural  equality  among  men.    
Yet  in  what  way  should  we  understand  this  natural  equality?  It  should  not  be  
forgotten  that  there  is  an  apparent  contradiction  between  the  state  of  nature  and  human  
relations.  As  I  have  noted,  it  seems  that  human  relations  come  into  being  only  when  
society  replaces  the  state  of  nature.  Then,  in  what  sense  can  it  be  possible  that  "ʺthe  true  
relations  of  man"ʺ  be  embodied  in  the  state  of  nature  where  savage  men  lead  their  own  
life  in  solidarity?  I  will  argue  that  this  contradiction  is  resolved  only  if  we  comprehend  
the  extent  to  which  Rousseau'ʹs  understanding  of  "ʺtrue  relations"ʺ  is  influenced  by  
methodologies  of  modern  natural  science.11    
Analytically  speaking,  there  can  be  two  different  types  of  relations.  One  type  is  
what  I  call  inter-­‐‑subjective.  Multiple  conscious  subjects  start  a  relation  when  they  
interact,  and  end  it  when  the  interaction  ceases.  Human  relations  are  usually  perceived  
in  this  sense,  because  human  society  appears  basically  conventional  and  thus  to  be  the  
outcome  of  constant  human  interactions.  The  other  type,  however,  is  objective.  Rather  
than  interaction  between  parties  involved  in  a  relation,  its  sole  basis  is  their  own  
                                                                                                              
10  Ibid:  236.    
11  I  am  not  going  to  argue  for  the  connection  of  methodologies  of  modern  science  to  treatments  of  human  
being  as  objective  thing  for  the  purpose  of  finding  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man,"ʺ  because  not  only  of  its  
irrelevance  to  present  purposes,  but  also  of  the  fact  that  Leo  Strauss  and  Marc  Plattner  have  already  
convincingly  connected  them.  See  Leo  Strauss:  Natural  Right  and  History.  Chicago,  IL:  The  University  of  
Chicago  Press,  1953:  265;  Marc  Plattner:  Rousseau'ʹs  State  of  Nature.  De  Kalb,  IL:  Northern  Illinois  University  
Press,  1964:  51.    
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properties12.  To  put  it  in  another  way,  this  type  of  relations  is  thing-­‐‑thing  relation.  (For  
example,  one  pound  of  wood  is  relatively  bigger  in  size  than  one  pound  of  iron;  or,  one  
pound  of  raw  wood  worthy  of  $10  is  as  heavy  in  weight  and  as  big  in  volume  as  a  piece  
of  wooden  furniture  worthy  of  $1000  made  out  of  one  pound  of  wood.)  Since  man  is  a  
thing  capable  of  interaction  -­‐‑-­‐‑  he  has  physical  properties  as  other  animals  and  things  do  -­‐‑
-­‐‑  this  type  of  relations  is  definitely  applicable  to  man  as  well.  Thus,  all  savage  men  are,  
for  instance,  equally  strong  in  body,  and  this  equality  in  strength  still  holds  even  if  they  
may  have  never  seen  any  other  members  of  their  species  throughout  their  lives  (that  is,  
may  have  never  had  interaction  with  them).13  In  this  sense,  natural  equality  can  be  seen  
as  non-­‐‑relational  and  actually  means  natural  similarity.    
This  latter  type  of  relations  is  exactly  the  one  upon  which  Rousseau  bases  his  
education  of  Emile.  Only  in  the  light  of  these  "ʺobjective"ʺ  relations  can  Rousseau  
denounces  those  inter-­‐‑subjective  relations  of  society  as  chimera.  Textual  evidences  in  
support  of  this  interpretation  of  Rousseau'ʹs  understanding  of  the  objective  nature  of  "ʺthe  
true  relations  of  man"ʺ  are  abundant  in  Emile.  Apart  from  the  one  cited  above  concerning  
the  "ʺde  facto  equality"ʺ  of  the  state  of  nature,  perhaps  the  best  recapture  of  these  "ʺtrue  
relations"ʺ  in  Book  IV  is  the  following:  "ʺMen  are  not  naturally  kings,  or  lords,  or  courtiers,  
or  rich  men.  All  are  born  naked  and  poor;  all  are  subject  to  the  miseries  of  life,  to  
                                                                                                              
12  The  word  "ʺproperty"ʺ  here  certainly  has  nothing  to  do  with  one'ʹs  financial  possession.  I  use  it  to  denote  all  
characteristics  that  a  thing  has  in  the  sense  of  physics.    
13  In  fact,  the  first  part  of  the  Second  Discourse  is  mainly  devoted  to  explaining  this.    
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sorrows,  ills,  needs,  and  pains  of  every  kind.  Finally,  all  are  condemned  to  death.  This  is  
what  truly  belongs  to  man.  This  is  what  no  mortal  is  exempt  from.  Begin,  therefore,  by  
studying  in  human  nature  what  is  most  inseparable  from  it,  what  best  characterizes  
humanity."ʺ14  (Bold  mine)  In  other  words,  all  human  identities  and  thus  social  relations  
among  them  do  not  necessarily  belong  to  man,  are  separable  from  human  nature,  and  
badly  characterize  humanity.  Moreover,  "ʺ...[M]an  is  the  same  in  all  stations;  the  rich  man  
does  not  have  a  bigger  stomach  than  the  poor  one  and  does  not  digest  better  than  he;  the  
master  does  not  have  arms  longer  or  stronger  than  his  slave'ʹs;  a  man  of  great  family  is  
no  greater  than  a  man  of  the  people;  and  finally,  as  the  natural  needs  are  everywhere  the  
same,  the  means  of  providing  for  them  ought  to  be  equal  everywhere...The  only  
ineffaceable  characters  are  those  printed  by  nature;  and  nature  does  not  make  princes,  
rich  men,  or  great  lords."ʺ15  (Bold  mine)  This  clearly  indicates  that  the  true  relations  of  
man  in  the  state  of  nature  are  essentially  physiological,  and  thus  objective,  similarities  
among  men.  They  are  "ʺthe  only  ineffaceable  characters"ʺ  of  man,  and  the  lack  of  
significant  difference  with  respect  to  these  objective  characters  prove  the  "ʺde  facto  
equality"ʺ  of  man  in  the  state  of  nature.  -­‐‑-­‐‑  This  argument  is  invincible,  because  the  
similarities  among  men  upon  which  Rousseau  bases  his  argument  are  precisely  what  
biologically  define  the  species  of  human  being.  A  man  born  with  wings  is  obvious  
                                                                                                              
14  Ibid:  222.    
15  Ibid:  194.    
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different  from  other  men,  but  it  might  be  questioned  if  the  winged  man  is  biologically  a  
man  at  all.  Rousseau,  whose  interest  in  botany  and  natural  history  it  is  life-­‐‑long,  thus  
successfully  finds  an  unchallengeable  ground  for  all  of  his  arguments  about  man.    
To  conclude,  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man"ʺ  as  natural/objective  equality  of  man  is  
the  most  essential  concept  in  "ʺthe  summary  of  the  whole  of  human  wisdom  in  the  use  of  
passions"ʺ  because  it  is  the  most  solid  philosophical  foundation  for  Rousseau'ʹs  solution  to  
the  inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre.    
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VII. "The True Relations of Man" Continued: Its 
Pedagogy   
I  have  illustrated  the  foundation  of  Rousseau'ʹs  project  of  taming  amour-­‐‑propre.  
The  only  thing  left  to  be  explained  is  how  Emile  may  learn  to  embrace  this  truth  about  
human  relations.  Two  epistemological  obstacles  must  be  overcome  before  we  can  
properly  understand  it.      
The  first  obstacle  is  that,  since  this  truth  has  been  buried  under  deceptive  social  
phenomena  and  thereby  becomes  almost  unobservable,  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  Emile  
is  able  to  grasp  what  he  cannot  directly  see.    
My  answer  is  the  following.  I  have  shown  in  Section  IV  that,  before  his  heart  is  
corrupted  by  society,  a  "ʺcarefully  raised"ʺ  young  man  such  as  Emile  naturally  develops  in  
his  heart  a  cosmopolitan  type  of  friendship  that  extends  him  to  human  being  at  large.  A  
young  man  as  such  therefore  initially  bears  in  his  heart  identification  of  himself  with  the  
species.  Since  this  identification  is  fragile  as  both  his  passions  for  sex  and  social  
prejudices  may  easily  put  an  end  to  it,  it  is  necessary  to  implant  in  him  the  solid  natural  
equality  of  man,  the  truth  about  human  relations,  so  as  to  secure  that  cosmopolitan  self-­‐‑
identification.1  This  implantation  as  the  way  to  preserve  this  cosmopolitan  self-­‐‑
identification  does  not  appear  groundless,  since  in  this  identification  lies  already  an  
                                                                                                              
1  "ʺAlthough  I  want  to  form  the  man  of  nature,  the  object  it  not,  for  all  that,  to  make  him  a  savage  and  to  
relegate  him  to  the  depths  of  the  woods.  It  suffices  that,  enclosed  in  a  social  whirlpool,  he  not  let  himself  get  
carried  away  by  either  the  passions  or  the  opinions  of  men,  that  he  see  with  his  eyes,  that  he  feel  with  his  
heart,  that  no  authority  govern  him  beyond  that  of  his  own  reason."ʺ  (Emile:  255)    
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unconscious  confirmation  of  human  equality  as  its  presupposition.  To  put  it  in  a  more  
modest  way,  though  Emile  has  knowledge  of  neither  equality  nor  inequality,  he  is  
friendlier  to  the  former,  provided  no  influence  of  society  affects  him.  Therefore,  it  is  less  
of  letting  Emile  see  what  he  does  not  have  in  mind  than  of  preserving  an  innate  
tendency  of  his,  which  is  in  accordance  with  "ʺnatural  goodness,"ʺ  in  the  face  of  social  
corruption.      
The  second  obstacle  is  more  difficult  to  tackle.  As  I  have  suggested  in  Section  III,  
what  is  known  is  not  necessarily  what  is  taken  seriously.  -­‐‑-­‐‑  This  suggestion  makes  it  
possible  to  identify  the  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  from  its  inflamed  type,  but  it  at  
the  same  time  burdens  us  to  show  how  Emile  learns  not  only  to  know  the  truth  about  
human  relations,  but  also  to  take  it  so  seriously  as  to  live  with  it  as  his  guide  to  moral  
actions.    
We  thus  need  to  go  back  to  "ʺthe  summary  of  the  whole  of  human  wisdom  in  the  
use  of  passions."ʺ  After  claiming  the  necessity  to  "ʺhave  a  sense  of  the  true  relations  of  
man,"ʺ  Rousseau  further  suggests  the  need  "ʺ[t]o  order  all  the  affections  of  the  soul  
according  to  these  relations."ʺ2  Here,  affection  is  in  contrast  to  reason.  For  Rousseau,  
moralities  are  not  purely  "ʺformed  by  understanding."ʺ  Rather,  they  "ʺare  true  affections  of  
the  soul  enlightened  by  reason."ʺ3  Therefore,  to  know  these  relations  in  mind  is  one  thing;  
                                                                                                              
2  Ibid:  219.    
3  Ibid:  235.    
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yet  in  order  to  let  Emile  act  according  to  them  as  his  moral  caliber,  it  is  more  important  
to  let  him  feel  this  natural  equality  in  heart:  "ʺby  reason  alone,  independent  of  conscience,  
no  natural  law  can  be  established;  and  [...]  the  entire  right  of  nature  is  only  a  chimera  if  it  
is  not  founded  on  a  natural  need  in  the  human  heart."ʺ4  
It  might  even  be  doubted  to  what  extent  Emile  needs  to  consciously  know  (on  
this  stage  of  his  growth,  at  least)  that  the  natural  equality  of  man  is  the  truth  about  
human  relations.  Emile  needs  to  "ʺhave  a  sense  of  the  true  relations  of  man."ʺ  This  
expression  suggests  that  it  is  not  necessarily  for  him  to  have  the  knowledge  of  the  true  
relations.  Moreover,  Rousseau  claims  that,  "ʺwe  must  know  what  position  he  feels  he  has  
among  men,  and  what  kinds  of  obstacles  he  may  believe  he  has  to  overcome  to  reach  the  
position  he  wants  to  occupy."ʺ5  (Underline  and  bold  mine)  As  Emile'ʹs  educator,  the  
governor  himself  needs  to  consciously  know  the  value  of  the  truth  about  human  
relations  so  as  to  teach  Emile  of  it,  whereas  Emile  needs  not  to  do  so;  it  suffices  for  him  
only  to  "ʺfeel"ʺ  it.  Simply  put,  to  let  Emile  take  the  natural  equality  of  man  seriously  is  
more  to  let  his  heart  moved  by  this  equality  than  to  acquaint  him  with  the  knowledge  of  
it.    
                                                                                                              
4  Ibid.    
5  Ibid.    
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"ʺBut  is  man  the  master  of  ordering  his  affections  according  to  this  or  that  
relation?"ʺ6  Thus  questions  Rousseau  rhetorically  immediately  after  summarizing  "ʺthe  
whole  of  human  wisdom  in  the  use  of  passions."ʺ  And  his  answer  is  clear:  "ʺWithout  a  
doubt,  if  he  is  master  of  directing  his  imagination  toward  this  or  that  object  or  of  giving  
it  this  or  that  habit."ʺ7  (Bold  mine)  I  am  not  going  to  start  a  lengthy  discussion  of  
imagination,  which  has  been  duly  paid  attention  to  in  numerous  books  and  articles.  In  
this  paper  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that,  to  direct  Emile'ʹs  imagination,  the  governor  must  
"ʺput  all  the  lessons  of  young  people  in  actions  rather  than  in  speeches."ʺ8  In  other  words,  
the  governor'ʹs  strategy  is  what  Rousseau  elsewhere  states  as  "ʺto  persuade  without  
convincing."ʺ9    
First,  Rousseau  suggests  the  following:  "ʺPut  their  nascent  imaginations  off  the  
track  with  objects  which,  far  from  inflaming,  repress  the  activity  of  their  senses...  Show  
them  only  scenes  which  are  touching  but  modest,  which  stir  them  without  seducing  
them,  and  which  nourish  their  sensibilities  without  moving  their  senses."ʺ10  For  example,  
a  young  man  should  be  occasionally  but  not  too  frequently  exposed  to  the  suffering  of  
                                                                                                              
6  Ibid:  219.    
7  Ibid.    
8  Ibid:  251.    
9  Christopher  Kelly  convincingly  argues  for  the  importance  of  this  strategy  to  the  Legislator  as  an  alternative  
to  both  rational  persuasion  and  conversion  by  force.  See  Christopher  Kelly:  "ʺ'ʹTo  Persuade  without  
Convincing'ʹ:  The  Language  of  Rousseau'ʹs  Legislator,"ʺ  American  Journal  of  Political  Science  Vol.  31,  No.  2  (May,  
1987):  321-­‐‑335.  This  non-­‐‑rational  approach  of  persuasion  is  widely  adopted  in  Rousseau'ʹs  advices  to  both  
personal  and  civil  education,  and  its  crucial  role  to  Rousseau'ʹs  teaching  is  thus  obvious.    
10  Emile:  230-­‐‑1.    
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sick  persons,  so  that  without  being  hardened  by  them,  his  heart  will  be  struck  by  the  
pains  that  he  realizes  he  may  equally  suffer.  Second,  the  governor  should  teach  his  pupil  
history.  "ʺIt  is  by  means  of  history  that,  without  the  lessons  of  philosophy,  he  will  read  
the  hearts  of  men."ʺ11  History,  especially  biography,  penetrates  the  appearance  of  great  
men  and  reveals  their  hearts  as  well  as  their  miseries  that  they  try  to  conceal.  Having  
examined  history,  the  pupil  comes  "ʺto  know  in  what  rank  among  his  fellows  he  will  put  
himself"ʺ12  -­‐‑-­‐‑  more  precisely,  to  know  the  equality  of  men  behind  social  masks.  This  is  a  
better  way  to  know  so  than  being  instructed  by  "ʺthe  lessons  of  philosophy,"ʺ  namely,  by  
abstract  eloquences,  since  philosophers  see  men  "ʺonly  through  the  prejudices  of  
philosophy."ʺ13  Third,  personal  experience  is  equally  important,  especially  given  that,  
"ʺFor  this  [vanity]  there  is  no  cure  other  than  experience."ʺ14  The  pupil  must  be  humiliated  
(rather  than  scolded)  in  a  proper  way  when  he  leans  towards  vanity,  because  concerning  
the  fact  that  "ʺhe  is  a  man  like  others  and  subject  to  the  same  weaknesses,"ʺ  the  governor  
needs  to  "ʺ[m]ake  him  feel  it,  or  he  will  never  know  it."ʺ15  Emile,  for  example,  is  struck  by  
his  actual  stupidity  in  "ʺthe  adventure  with  the  magician"ʺ  and  thus  understands  that  he  is  
no  clever  than  other  spectators  of  the  magic.  Moreover,  it  is  necessary  for  the  governor  
                                                                                                              
11  Ibid:  237.    
12  Ibid:  243.    
13  Ibid.    
14  Ibid:  245.    
15  Ibid.    
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not  to  teach  Emile  of  the  harm  of  vanity  in  speech,  since  that  will  only  inflame  his  amour-­‐‑
propre  and  thus  make  him  resist  the  governor.16  Fourth,  fables  are  needed  to  deepen  the  
pupil'ʹs  lessons  from  his  experience:  "ʺ[B]y  means  of  the  fable  the  experience  he  would  
soon  have  forgotten  is  imprinted  on  his  judgment."ʺ17  Yet  the  pupil  must  draw  maxim  
from  the  fables  by  himself,  rather  than  be  told  so  by  the  storyteller,  since  what  is  told  is  
not  as  touching  as  what  is  felt.    
"ʺI  believe  that  in  following  the  one  I  have  indicated,"ʺ  states  Rousseau  after  
illustrating  the  above,  "ʺyour  pupil  will  purchase  knowledge  of  men  and  of  himself  as  
cheaply  as  possible,  and  that  you  will  put  him  in  a  position  to  contemplate  his  games  of  
Fortune  without  envying  the  fate  of  its  favorites,  and  to  be  satisfied  with  himself  without  
believing  himself  to  be  wiser  than  others."ʺ18  Finally,  this  positive  effect  of  his  education  
is  perpetuated  by  "ʺthe  exercise  of  the  social  virtues,"ʺ  which  "ʺbrings  the  love  of  humanity  
to  the  depths  of  one'ʹs  heart,"ʺ  rather  than  by  "ʺoratorical  art,"ʺ  because  "ʺIt  is  in  doing  good  
that  one  becomes  good;  I  know  of  no  practice  more  certain."ʺ19    
In  these  ways,  Emile'ʹs  imagination  is  properly  directed  and  his  affections  thus  
ordered  according  to  the  indestructible  natural  equality  of  man.  Envy,  the  problem  of  
amour-­‐‑propre,  and  vanity,  the  problem  of  pity,  are  finally  solved.    
                                                                                                              
16  Ibid:  247.    
17  Ibid:  248.    
18  Ibid:  249.    
19  Ibid:  250.    
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VIII. Pity Revisited: Its Uses and Limits 
We  are  still  justified  to  wonder  what  positive  role  pity  plays  in  taming  amour-­‐‑
propre  if  pity  is  as  problematic  as  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  Based  upon  my  
previous  arguments,  pity  is  definitely  useful,  but  not  omnipotent.    
On  the  one  hand,  most  of  my  previous  reconstruction  of  Rousseau'ʹs  account  of  
pity  is  still  valid.  Since  pity  is  a  natural  sentiment  that  comes  into  effect  in  the  face  of  
miseries  of  others,  it  serves  as  one  of  the  "ʺaffections"ʺ  to  show  Emile  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  
man"ʺ  without  convincing  him  of  their  truthfulness.  As  Rousseau  puts  it,  "ʺIf  our  common  
needs  unite  us  by  interest,  our  common  miseries  unite  us  by  affection."ʺ1  Moreover,  pity  
is  probably  more  reliable  than  other  affections,  because  it  is  natural  in  the  sense  that  it  
has  the  potentiality  to  be  successfully  triggered  in  everyone'ʹs  heart.    
On  the  other  hand,  the  difficulties  intrinsic  to  pity  warn  us  of  two  things  and  
impel  us  to  revise  the  previous  reconstruction.  First,  pity  is  not  able  to  let  young  pupil  
identify  himself  with  his  species.  It  can  only  help  him  confirm  this  identity  before  social  
inequality  corrupts  his  heart  and  induces  him  to  deny  it.  For  pupil  who  has  already  been  
corrupted  and  thus  unable  to  completely  identify  himself  with  his  species,  pity  alone  is  
not  enough  to  save  him  from  negative  effects  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  Other  remedies,  such  as  
                                                                                                              
1  Emile:  221.    
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religion,  must  come  in  aid.2  Second,  pity  must  be  used  with  caution,  because  there  are  
more  than  one  types  of  pity  with  respect  to  its  object  (the  human  species,  or  particular  
individual),  whereas  Rousseau  only  acknowledges  the  usefulness  of  one  specific  type  
that  presupposes  a  common  identity  of  human  being.  Pity  that  fails  to  take  this  common  
identity  as  its  presupposition  and  thus  fails  to  take  the  human  species  as  its  object  is  
ineffective  in  taming  amour-­‐‑propre  because  pity  as  such  cannot  prevent  one  from  
separating  men  into  different  groups  of  different  values,  from  identifying  oneself  with  
one  of  these  groups,  and  thus  from  taking  seriously  comparisons  among  these  groups.    
With  regard  to  these  two  warnings,  it  must  be  noted  that  a  few  scholars  fail  to  
notice  Rousseau'ʹs  differentiation  among  diverse  types  of  pity.  They  treat  features,  
mostly  weaknesses,  of  one  type  of  pity  as  the  essential  characteristics  of  Rousseau'ʹs  
general  idea  of  pity,  and  thus  fail  to  see  that  the  specific  type  of  pity  Rousseau  actually  
seeks  to  achieve  in  Emile'ʹs  education  is  designed  precisely  to  avoid  these  weaknesses.    
Based  upon  his  close  examination  of  the  Second  Discourse,  Richard  Boyd  claims,  
"ʺ[P]ity  rests  inexorably  on  a  sense  of  difference,  is  fueled  by  an  aversion  to  suffering,  and  
                                                                                                              
2  This  is  illustrated  in  the  story  of  the  young  man  and  the  Savoyard  vicar  immediately  following  the  first  
part  of  Book  IV.  The  young  man'ʹs  education  does  not  end  when  his  pity  is  reinvigorated.  Having  been  
blinded  by  his  passions  and  opinions  of  others,  he  cannot  understand  through  his  pity  of  others  that  real  
happiness  can  only  be  acquired  beyond  human  relations  and  comparisons.  Yet  if  he  is  unable  to  understand  
this,  he  will  not  be  able  to  give  up  the  mode  of  thinking  that  presupposes  happiness  to  be  found  in  certain  
social  standings.  This  is  why  the  vicar  needs  to  teach  the  young  man  of  religion,  which  decisively  breaks  this  
mode  of  thinking,  exactly  when  the  young  man,  whose  pity  it  has  already  been  reinvigorated  and  who  has  
thus  realized  the  miseries  of  those  who  appear  happy,  is  suffered  at  the  thought  that  he  may  not  be  able  to  
find  happiness  at  all.    
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is  more  likely  to  yield  a  world  of  'ʹreluctant  spectators'ʹ  than  one  of  simple  souls  eagerly  
rushing  to  the  aid  of  others."ʺ  He  thus  concludes  that  these  features  of  pity  challenges  the  
idea  that  pity  "ʺleads  ultimately  to  communion  with  our  fellow-­‐‑creatures."ʺ3  This  view  of  
pity  is  obviously  trapped  by  the  thought  that  pity  is  the  cause  of  one'ʹs  identification  with  
the  species.  On  the  contrary,  Emile,  who  has  already  been  able  to  identify  himself  with  
his  species,  is  taught  to  practice  "ʺthe  exercise  of  the  social  virtues,"ʺ  which  further  helps  
foster  his  sense  of  natural  equality  of  man  and  directs  him  to  have  an  "ʺactive  
beneficence"ʺ4  that  encourages  him  to  assist  the  people  whom  he  pities.5  Therefore,  that  
pity  presupposes  a  sense  of  difference  is  not  a  problem  to  Emile'ʹs  education  because  
Emile'ʹs  pity  should  be  a  different  kind  that  has  an  entirely  different  presupposition.  
Moreover,  the  problems  that  Boyd'ʹs  version  of  pity  may  cause  are  precisely  the  ones  that  
Emile'ʹs  education  particularly  aims  to  eliminate.    
Similarly,  arguing  that  Rousseau  regards  pity  "ʺas  a  stepping-­‐‑stone  to  justice,"ʺ  
Richard  White  infers  that  Rousseau  "ʺbelieves  that  there  are  proper  limits  to  compassion:  
not  only  is  it  difficult  to  feel  compassion  for  those  who  are  bad,  but  it  would  actually  be  
                                                                                                              
3  Richard  Boyd:  "ʺPity'ʹs  Pathologies  Portrayed:  Rousseau  and  the  Limits  of  Democracy,"ʺ  Political  Theory  Vol.  
32,  No.  4  (Aug,  2004):  519.    
4  Emile:  251.    
5  "ʺIf  he  sees  discord  reigning  among  his  comrades,  he  seeks  to  reconcile  them;  if  he  sees  men  afflicted,  he  
informs  himself  as  to  the  subject  of  their  suffering;  if  he  sees  two  men  who  hate  each  other,  he  wants  to  
know  the  cause  of  their  enmity;  if  he  sees  an  oppressed  man  groaning  under  the  vexations  of  the  powerful  
and  the  rich,  he  finds  out  what  maneuvers  are  used  to  cover  over  those  vexations;  and,  with  the  interest  he  
takes  in  all  men  who  are  miserable,  the  means  of  ending  their  ills  are  never  indifferent  to  him."ʺ  (Emile:  251)  
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wrong  to  feel  compassion  for  them."ʺ  Therefore,  he  concludes  that,  "ʺThis  limited  and  
conditional  compassion  divides  the  world  into  separate  souls  -­‐‑-­‐‑  those  who  are  worthy  of  
compassion  and  those  who  do  not  deserve  it.  It  separates  rather  than  unifies."ʺ6  White'ʹs  
conclusion  is  correct  in  that  it  sees  that  Rousseau  sets  certain  limits  to  pity.  However,  
White  does  not  notice  that  Rousseau  also  claims  that,  "ʺIn  a  word,  teach  your  pupil  to  
love  all  men,  even  those  who  despise  men."ʺ7  Moreover,  although  he  is  aware  of  
Rousseau'ʹs  claim  that,  "ʺFor  the  sake  of  reason,  for  the  sake  of  love  or  ourselves,  we  must  
have  pity  for  our  species  still  more  than  for  our  neighbor,  and  pity  for  the  wicked  is  a  
very  great  cruelty  to  men"ʺ8,  White  ignores  Rousseau'ʹs  apparent  self-­‐‑contradiction  in  this  
claim:  If  one  should  pity  one'ʹs  species  as  a  whole,  then  why  the  wicked  men  should  not  
be  pitied?  If  only  good  people  (in  contrast  to  the  wicked)  should  be  pitied,  then  how  is  it  
possible  to  pity  our  species  as  a  whole  rather  than  mere  certain  members  of  our  species?  
In  contrast  to  White'ʹs  claim,  my  understanding  is  the  following.  The  wicked  are  also  
members  of  the  species.  They  commit  crimes  when  they  despise  men  (otherwise  they  
will  pity  men  and  thus  will  not  benefit  themselves  at  the  cost  of  others'ʹ  miseries).  Emile  
should  not  pity  them  as  criminals  -­‐‑  pity  as  such  is  mere  softness,  because  it  is  "ʺa  blind  
preference  founded  solely  on  consideration  of  persons"ʺ  rather  than  of  the  human  
                                                                                                              
6  Richard  White:  "ʺRousseau  and  the  Education  of  Compassion,"ʺ  Journal  of  Philosophy  of  Education  Vol.  42,  No.  
1  (2008):  43.    
7  Emile:  226.    
8  Ibid:  253.    
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species9  -­‐‑-­‐‑  nevertheless,  as  members  of  the  human  species,  they  deserve  Emile'ʹs  pity  
because  they  also  suffer  from  their  own  folly  (in  particular,  from  their  inflamed  amour-­‐‑
propre).  Thus,  pity  neither  necessarily  separates  nor  necessarily  unifies.  When  one  sees  
through  all  kinds  of  social  masks  and  treats  everyone  as  equal  member  of  the  species,  
one'ʹs  pity  tends  to  confirm  this  sight  and  treatment.  However,  when  one  has  already  
been  deceived  by  social  masks  and  thus  separated  the  species  into  different  groups  of  
people  (criminals,  non-­‐‑criminals,  etc.),  one'ʹs  pity  hardly  does  anything  but  confirming  
this  deception  and  separation.    
  
                                                                                                              
9  Ibid:  252.    
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IX. Conclusion: Amour-Propre Successfully Tamed 
Having  freed  Emile  from  both  envy  and  vanity  by  directing  his  imagination  and  
thus  basing  his  moral  standard  upon  natural  equality  of  man,  the  education  of  Emile  
against  his  amour-­‐‑propre  ends  up  in  success,  theoretically  if  not  practically.1  It  is  
successful,  because  this  basis  of  natural  equality  of  man,  solid  and  indestructible,  can  
truly  overcome  the  unavoidable  weakness  of  human  comparison  in  society.    
As  we  have  seen,  it  is  due  to  a  same  reason  that  amour-­‐‑propre  tends  to  deteriorate  
into  envy,  and  pity  into  vanity:  both  amour-­‐‑propre  and  pity  are  characterized  by  relativity  
that  entails  one'ʹs  comparisons  with  socialized  men.  Since  these  comparisons  themselves  
(not  to  mention  their  substantial  content)  are  inter-­‐‑subjective  in  nature  and  are  thus  
products  of  society,  one  fails  to  truly  stand  aloof  from  society  as  soon  as  one  begins  to  
take  seriously  any  comparison  between  oneself  and  others,  even  if  it  is  driven  by  neither  
love  nor  the  partisan  type  of  friendship  -­‐‑-­‐‑  as  shown  in  vanity  caused  by  pity,  for  
example.    
Therefore,  the  only  way  to  prevent  this  failure  is  to  base  one'ʹs  judgment  upon  
something  so  real  as  to  be  indestructible  in  a  fluctuating  world.  This  indestructible  thing  
                                                                                                              
1  McLendon  argues  that  Rousseau'ʹs  solution  to  the  inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  retreatment  to  rural  life  
from  commercial,  urban  societies.  This  argument  is  convincing  due  to  sufficient  textual  evidences  provided  
by  Rousseau,  but  it  is  less  a  theoretical  solution  than  a  practical  one,  whereas  the  probability  of  any  practical  
solution  hinges  firstly  upon  its  theoretical  possibility.  Although  he  correctly  points  out  that  the  reason  why  
the  rural  life  is  a  plausible  way-­‐‑out  is  that  it  most  helpfully  cultivates  a  cosmopolitan  identity  of  Emile'ʹs  and  
at  the  same  time  minimizes  his  self-­‐‑identity,  McLendon  does  not  notice  that  the  cosmopolitan  identity  and  
the  minimal  self-­‐‑identity  appear  more  justified  and  thus  more  persuasive  to  Emile  than  other  possibilities  
only  because  they  have  the  natural  equality  of  man  as  their  basis.  (McLendon:  1,  7-­‐‑9).    
  47  
is  exactly  the  natural  equality  (or  similarity)  with  respect  to  man'ʹs  
physiological/objective  properties,  that  is,  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man."ʺ  With  this  image  of  
natural  equality  of  man  perpetuated  in  his  mind,  Emile  is  able  to  not  take  social  relations  
seriously  in  an  age  when  he  has  to  know  them.  His  amour-­‐‑propre  can  thus  remain  
innocuous.  More  specifically,  having  been  touched  by  this  indestructible  
natural/objective  equality,  Emile  will  not  envy  those  who  appear  superior  and  happy,  
because  he  is  sure  that  they  are  equally  constituted  as  he  is  and  thus  all  of  them  
necessarily  suffer  from  same  miseries.  Similarly,  he  will  not  despise  those  whom  he  
pitied,  because  his  knowledge  of  the  natural  equality  ensures  him  that,  as  long  as  he  is  a  
man,  there  is  nothing  of  his  constitution  essentially  superior  to/different  from  others'ʹ.  It  
is  based  upon  this  equality  that  Emile  identifies  himself  with  his  species.2    
Only  in  this  light  can  we  understand  how  one  of  Rousseau'ʹs  major  statements  in  
Book  II  of  Emile  still  makes  sense  in  Book  IV.  There,  Rousseau  differentiates  two  kinds  of  
dependence,  which  "ʺserve[s]  to  resolve  all  the  contradictions  of  the  social  system."ʺ  
"ʺThere  are  two  sorts  of  dependence:  dependence  on  things,  which  is  from  nature;  
dependence  on  men,  which  is  from  society."ʺ  Whereas  dependence  on  things  "ʺis  in  no  
way  detrimental  to  freedom  and  engenders  no  vices,"ʺ  dependence  on  men  "ʺengenders  
                                                                                                              
2  From  this  perspective,  we  can  better  understand  why  Emile  is  "ʺa  man  who  is  superior  to  others  and,  unable  
to  raise  them  to  his  level,  is  capable  of  lowering  himself  to  theirs."ʺ  (Emile:  253)  This  "ʺlowering  himself  to  
theirs"ʺ  of  course  does  not  mean  that  Emile  participates  in  their  corruptions.    
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all  the  vices."ʺ  3  This  understanding  is  still  valid  even  when  Emile  has  to  get  involved  in  
social  life.  Emile  will  not  become  dependent  on  men,  since  by  relying  upon  "ʺthe  true  
relations  of  man,"ʺ  man'ʹs  essence  is  understood  as  thing  with  stable  
physiological/physical  properties.  In  other  words,  Rousseau  eliminates  the  need  of  
dependence  on  men  not  by  eliminating  dependence  but  by  re-­‐‑categorizing  men  as  
things.    
One  important  theoretical  implication  thus  follows.  Since  amour-­‐‑propre  is  tamed  
only  when  one  disregards  any  inter-­‐‑subjective  comparison,  simply  relying  on  equal  
acknowledgement  of  each  individual'ʹs  moral  value  is  not  enough  to  tame  it,  because  the  
equal  acknowledgement  itself  is  inter-­‐‑subjective.  This,  however,  is  what  Dent  fails  to  see.  
His  solution  to  amour-­‐‑propre  is  thus  problematic.    
Dent  signifies  the  importance  of  "ʺthe  true  relations  of  man"ʺ  to  the  education  of  
Emile,  but  he  understands  it  as  the  inter-­‐‑subjective  kind  of  relations  and  thus  claims  that  
the  education  of  Emile  against  inflamed  amour-­‐‑propre  is  to  teach  him  the  importance  to  
treat  everyone  as  equal  moral  beings,  since  all  kinds  of  "ʺde-­‐‑humanization"ʺ  of  others  are,  
as  Dent  argues,  the  origin  of  the  inflamed  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre.  Once  Emile  
acknowledges  the  equal  moral  value  in  each,  he  will  give  equal  respect  to  each  
                                                                                                              
3  Emile:  85.    
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accordingly.  Having  been  equally  respected,  each  is  thus  no  longer  "ʺde-­‐‑humanized,"ʺ  and  
the  origin  of  the  inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  thus  eliminated.  4    
This  solution  is  problematic  in  at  least  two  ways.5  First,  the  connection  of  "ʺde-­‐‑
humanization"ʺ  (that  is,  treating  others  as  things  rather  than  as  equal  moral  beings)  to  
inflammation  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  tenable  only  if  the  one  who  "ʺde-­‐‑humanizes"ʺ  others  fails  
to  equally  "ʺde-­‐‑humanize"ʺ  oneself.  While  this  failure  is  indeed  able  to  trigger  the  feelings  
of  superiority  and  inferiority,  equal  de-­‐‑humanization,  which  brings  everyone  down  to  a  
same  level,  renders  these  feelings  impossible.    
Second,  and  more  importantly,  the  equal  acknowledgement  of  moral  values  of  
each  and  the  subsequent  equal  respect  to  each  are  fundamentally  relative.6  They  thus  
may  as  well  rely  upon  the  opinion  of  others  as  any  inter-­‐‑subjective  comparison  does.  
Emile  lives  in  a  wicked  world  beyond  his  control.  His  giving  equal  respect  to  others  has  
nothing  to  do  with  others'ʹ  giving  equal  respect  to  him  in  return.  -­‐‑-­‐‑  We  must  keep  in  
mind  that  Emile  in  his  adolescence  is  indeed  loving,  but  not  necessarily  lovable.  In  fact,  
it  is  more  probable  that  he  is  less  lovable  in  the  eyes  of  society,  as  Rousseau  implies  in  
                                                                                                              
4  Nicholas  Dent:  Rousseau:  An  Introduction  to  his  Psychological,  Social  and  Political  Theory.  Oxford:  Basil  
Blackwell,  1988:  21-­‐‑7,  114.    
5  For  more  critiques  of  Dent'ʹs  solution,  see  Neuhouser:  59-­‐‑70,  McLendon:  11-­‐‑2.      
6  As  Neuhouser  understands,  "ʺIt  is  important  to  note...  that  a  relative  standing  is  not  necessarily  a  superior  
or  inferior  one.  If  what  one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  leads  one  to  seek  is  simply  the  respect  one  deserves  as  a  human  
being  -­‐‑  respect  one  is  willing  to  return  to  others  in  the  same  measure  -­‐‑  then  the  standing  one  seeks  is  
comparative  (defined  in  relation  to  that  of  others)  but  not  superior;  equal  standing,  in  other  words,  is  still  
standing  relative  to  others."ʺ  (Neuhouser:  33)  
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this  statement:  "ʺI  do  not  know  whether  my  young  man,  because  he  has  not  learned  to  
imitate  conventional  manners  and  to  feign  sentiments  he  does  not  have,  will  be  less  
loveable."ʺ7  -­‐‑-­‐‑  Therefore,  Emile'ʹs  conviction  in  equal  moral  value  of  man  may  always  be  
frustrated  when  others  do  not  respect  him  as  much  as  he  does  them.  This  frustration  is  
precisely  the  thing  that  leads  one'ʹs  innocuous  type  of  amour-­‐‑propre  to  transform  into  the  
inflamed  type,  as  I  have  already  illustrated  in  Section  II.    
Another  theoretical  implication  of  Rousseau'ʹs  solution  to  Emile'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  
follows  from  the  previous  one.  Knowing  all  the  social  relations  without  taking  any  of  
them  seriously,  Emile  is  fundamentally  a  spectator  of  human  society.  -­‐‑-­‐‑  He  is  in  it,  but  
not  part  of  it.  Thus,  Emile'ʹs  education  is  not  and  probably  must  not  be  extended  to  the  
whole  society  due  to  not  only  the  practical  impossibility  to  educate  each  child  in  such  a  
meticulous  way  but  also  the  philosophical  nature  of  this  education:  its  general  
application  will  leads  to  nothing  but  the  demise  of  society,  as  everyone  will  thus  retreat  
to  one'ʹs  own  realm  without  truly  caring  about  the  life  of  others  except  for  being  
occasionally  driven  by  sudden  impulses  to  temporarily  do  so  when  they  suffer.  In  the  
Discourse  on  Political  Economy,  a  work  discussing  an  ideal  political  rather  than  personal  
arrangement,  Rousseau  states  that,  "ʺIt  seems  that  the  sentiment  of  humanity  evaporates  
and  weakens  as  it  is  extended  over  the  whole  world."ʺ  Therefore,  "ʺCommiseration  must  
                                                                                                              
7  Emile:  230.    
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in  some  way  be  confined  and  compressed  to  be  activated."ʺ8  As  a  result,  if  society  is  
changeable,  then  perhaps  the  alternative  that  the  legislator  may  try  to  tame  the  amour-­‐‑
propre  of  a  group  of  men  is  to  organize  them  into  a  people  and  to  confine  their  
commiseration  therein,  rather  than  to  refer  to  a  cosmopolitan  identity  -­‐‑-­‐‑  This  is  the  
content  of  Social  Contract.  Nevertheless,  if  one  cannot  change  one'ʹs  society,  then  taming  
one'ʹs  amour-­‐‑propre  in  the  way  adopted  in  the  case  of  Emile  is  probably  a  better  choice.  
This  choice  cannot  save  the  whole  society  from  corruption,  but  can  at  least  save  one  
individual  with  success.    
Finally,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  entire  account  above  of  the  way  of  taming  
amour-­‐‑propre  is  based  only  upon  the  first  part  of  Book  IV  of  Emile.  It  must  be  
remembered  that  in  this  account,  love,  which  is  both  partisan  and  reciprocal,  and  which  
constantly  induces  adolescents'ʹ  amour-­‐‑propre  to  get  inflamed,  is  only  postponed  rather  
than  confronted.  One  may  thus  wonder  how  the  governor  would  educate  Emile  when  
Emile'ʹs  love  cannot  be  delayed  any  longer.  As  we  proceed  with  our  textual  analysis  of  
the  rest  of  Book  IV  and  the  entire  Book  V,  we  will  see  that  this  apparently  sound  
solution  to  the  problem  of  amour-­‐‑propre  is  in  tension  with  Rousseau'ʹs  further  account  of  
Emile'ʹs  education,  and  textual  evidences  will  show  that  Rousseau  is  well  conscious  of  
this  tension.  A  full  explanation  of  this  tension,  however,  has  to  be  developed  elsewhere.    
                                                                                                              
8  Rousseau:  Discourse  on  Political  Economy.  From  On  the  Social  Contract,  with  Geneva  Manuscript  and  Political  
Economy  (Roger  D.  Masters  et.  al  ed.),  New  York,  NY:  St.  Martin'ʹs  Press,  1978:  219.      
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